Self-Deception


"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen, and philosophers and divines" - Emmerson

The concept of self-deception has long been an attractive issue of study for philosophers interested in common language analysis. The attraction rises from the inherent paradox that arises from the state of being self-deceptive and the process of becoming self-deceived . Normally, one models what it means to be self-deceived after what it means to be deceived by someone else. It is often held that for you to deceive me, you must get me to believe wholeheartedly in a proposition that you know, or at least sincerely believe to be false. Following this model, then, self deception occurs when I can get myself to believe a proposition that I truly know is false. The paradox is that in order for self deception to be valid, an individual must hold at the same time, two contradictory propositions (p and not-p) and believe them both to be true. There have been various responses to this paradox from outright rejection of the concept, through to a rejection of the principle of contradiction. In this paper, I wish to consider 3 responses to the paradox of self-deception. 1) Partitioning strategies, 2) Redefinition Strategies, and 3) Para consistent Logic. I will claim that neither of these responses provides a sufficient explanation or solution to the problem. I will argue that, although there certainly seems to be valid cases of self-deception as we conceive it through common language, the analytic attempts have thus far been relatively unsuccessful.

Partitioning Strategies

Many philosophers have made sense of the self-deception paradox by partitioning the mind into separate logical subjects. In doing so, an individual can hold a proposition and the opposite of the proposition without being in a state of contradiction. If, for example, I hold the proposition p and not-p, and I believe them to be true, I am in a state of contradiction because I do not actually believe anything. However, if the mind consists of two or more parts, I can hold the proposition p (along with various reasons for p) within one part, ad the proposition not-p (along with reasons) in the other part. So long at these two parts are distinct, there will never be a contradiction.

One such practitioner is Ralphael Demos. He accepts the standard view that self-deception involves a contradiction:

"Self deception exists, I will say, when a person lies to himself, that is to say, persuades himself to believe what he knows is not so. In short, self-deception entails that B believes both P and not-P at the same time (1960, p.588).

But he divides the mind into distinct parts, separated by "levels of awareness":

"There are two levels of awareness possible; one is a simple awareness, the other awareness together with attending, nor noticing. It follows that I may be aware of something without, at the same time noticing it or focusing my attention on it" (p.593)

Therefore, for Demos, the deceiver is capable of simultaneously believing p and not-p "because he is distracted from the former" (p.594).

The problem with this view is stated succinctly by Herbert Fingarette (1969), who argues that Demo's own position is paradoxical. He points out that deception must be an intentional act. Therefore, if I am to deceive you, I must intend to pull the wool over your eyes. If I am merely wrong about a proposition I convince you to believe, but I sincerely believe that it is true, I have not deceived you - I have only demonstrated by ignorance. Similarly, if I am to deceive myself, I must do so intentionally. Therefore, the 2 propositions p (true) and not-p (false) and I notice not-p, but do not notice p (because not-p is distracting me) I am not self-deceived, merely ignorant of p. Furthermore, Finagarette argues, and individual cannot intentionally fail to notice p, because she has already noticed it: "it appears that it is just because he already appreciates the incompatibility of his beliefs that the self-deceiver 'deliberately ignores' the belief he abhors" (p.16). In this case, the individual would be arty to two contradictory beliefs, and the portioning strategy advanced by Demos has not helped us with the paradox.

Redefinition Strategies

Most common approaches to self-deception insist that the deception seen in self-deceptive situations is the same as the deception seen in interpersonal models. However, there are scholars who believe that the interpersonal models of deception are insufficient to describe self deception. As Mele (1987) states:

"One approach to resolving the paradox of self-deception is to abandon some pertinent features of interpersonal models of he phenomenon. Perhaps it is typically true that when A deceives B, A knows or believes the truth and intentionally gets B to believe a falsehood. But must the self-deceiver know or believe the truth and believe the negation of the true propositions?" (1987, p.8)

Mele answers in the negative, arguing that self-deception occurs because individuals prefer certain beliefs over others. These preferences direct individuals to manipulate the truth value of the respective claims. Thus,

". . . because, e.g., he (the subject takes a certain datum d to count against p, which proposition he wants to be the case, he may intentionally or unintentionally shift his attention away from d whenever he has thoughts of d; but to do this he need not believe that p is false"(1983, p.372).

Therefore, on this view, there is no requirement that the person believes not-p (regarded as true). I a mother wants her son to be good, but the relevant data would lead her to believe otherwise, she might manipulate the implications of the data, or the content of the data itself to represent that belief, but she does not also have to have a belief that her on is not-good the paradox of having two contradictory beliefs is thus avoided.

This is a nice distinction, but we are now left to wonder on the relationship between an individual perceiving a data set and the sae individual drawing conclusions based upon that data set. For Mele's distinction to hold, it seems that an individual would be able to perceive a data set, compare it with the desired proposition, and recognize that the two are inconsistent, ad then modify the dataset to match the desired belief, all without ever holding the contrary position. If a mother can recognize the data set about her son (i.e., that he steals from people and is continually violent), and she can recognize that these facts are inconsistent with her to have a good son, given Mele's logic, two cases are possible. If she manipulates this data "intentionally", she is aware of the not-good proposition and is in fact holding two contradictory beliefs. If, on the other hand, the data manipulation is done unintentionally ("presumably without awareness), it is being accomplished at a lower level of "awareness". If we claim that there are levels of awareness, we have another variant of a portioned mind theory, ad the problems we have already discussed crop up again. It seems that Mele's distinction is thus not valid.

Para consistent Logic Strategies

Up until now we have looked at theories that have had a goal of saving the concept or, self-deception from contradiction. This is because it is taken for granted by most that the formal logic principle of contradiction is as basic as you can get in philosophy; that is, all arguments should be free from contradiction. However, in recent logic theory, the foundational truth of the contradiction principle is being questioned by proponents of Para consistent logic . As it should be expected, this approach has been applied to the problem of self-deception. One of the primary examples of this approach can be found in da Costa and French (1990), who's explicit intention, is to:

"Liberate discussion of self-deception from the shackles of a purely classical logic, thereby permitting a separation of the more philosophical issues from those which might properly be described as "logical" (p.179).

Put simply, their approach will put forward "a Para consistent system which seems capable of accommodating contradictory beliefs" so that the paradox of self-deception no longer exists.

This is an interesting approach that is coupled with a full alternate logic system in the appendix of the paper. The details of logic systems are, for the purpose of this paper, less important than the rationale for adopting this approach. Da Costa and French begin by accepting the distinction between an unintentional inconsistency and an intentional inconsistency. They claim, quite reasonably, that a person may easily enter upon an unintentional inconsistency:

"We are not logically omniscient in the sense of being able to immediately deduce all the consequences of a given proposition that can be deduced by anyone that demands such omniscience is clearly asking too much"(p.185).

Unintentional inconsistencies are not of major interest, however. In fact, there presence in any belief system is a trivial claim; since they are unintentional they are not present in mind at all. What is interesting, for da Costa and French, is what happens when an individual becomes aware of an inconsistency in her belief system. In this case, the inconsistency becomes intentional, and:

"It might be argued that the only rational thing to do is to suitably rearrange one's set of beliefs with a view to eliminate the contradiction of the system"(p.186)

This is where the problem lies, for da Costa and French. They claim that because our standard belief systems are full of an incalculable number of inconsistent deductive chains, it may be impossible to eliminate an intentional inconsistency completely anyway. This is their reasoning for suggesting that the principle of contradiction be "weaken[ed] or abandoned altogether" (p.177)

They then turn to attack the principle of consistency on what they call pragmatic grounds. They ask us to consider an individual that has p and not-p in his mind. Both propositions, they claim reflect the process of reasoning over some sort of empirical data. There is usually lots of empirical data, and this data is usually able to be mobilized for different arguments. As such, an individual holding the propositions p and not-p might well have god reasons for both positions because the data supports them equally well. Thus,

"The removal of inconsistency in this manner may therefore be a practically impossible, or near impossible, undertaking. One might have good reason to hold both of a pair of contradictory beliefs. Thus, for example, the same empirical evidence might equally support the same two conflicting theories, or different, but equally acceptable, pieces of evidence might support two contradictory propositions within a given theory . . . "(p.186).

In this view, a mother who sees her son might view the facts (i.e., "that he is kind towards a senior") and hold the position that her son is good. On the other hand, she might view another set of facts (i.e., that he steals and is violent) and hold the proposition that her son is not-good. Da Costa and French believe that this consists in holding two contradictory propositions; and, more importantly, they hold that this inconsistency is inherent for human beings trying to understand the complex world. As this is par for human existence, we should not be rigid on the logic of contradiction and perhaps a logic that abandons this principle is in line with how we process information anyway (p.190). With this new logic that accepts contradictions, self-deception would be a valid concept, despite the fact that it depends on contradiction.

This argument sounds acceptable at first glance. However, if considered, I think there is something wrong with it. The main thrust of the argument is that human beings naturally hold inconsistent thoughts and there is no ridding ourselves of inconsistency. As such, we are setting our goals too high to ask for consistent thoughts by utilizing the principle of contradiction. This argument depends; it seems, on two things. First, it depends on a set of facts that are so infinitely complex that we can never determine them all (or know when we have); and second, it depends on individuals "collecting" distinct propositions based upon differing data.

Although the first dependency may not be self-obvious, it is sound enough to leave it be here. However, it is not at al clear that individuals may draw distinct propositions based on differing data. That every month will draw two inconsistent propositions from the fact that "my son steals" and "my son is kind to seniors" require much more argument than is present. Rather than drawing the inconsistent -distinct- propositions "my son is god" and "my son is not good", it seems equally likely that the conclusion might be the consistent claim that "my son is imperfect". Or, assuming that an individual might value private property more than a principle of kindness, these two facts might still manifest themselves into the propositions "my son is not-god". I suggest here that da Costa and French are relying upon a theory of data collection and synthesis that they have certainly not argued for. It is not clear that humans are naturally inconsistent at al, except in the sense that they've defined it.

Conclusions: Is Self-Deception a Viable Concept?

When I first began this paper, I believed self-deception to be a viable notion, resting not on a contradiction between two contradictory propositions, but on a distinction between the real state of affairs and an individual's Ideal state of affairs. I am now uncertain that this claim can be made. After all, would this not still be a contradiction in beliefs? For instance, a contradiction in the belief f what is real and what one wish to be real? Perhaps there is some room to move with this claim because a wish might not hold the same epistemic status that a belief would (i.e., the status of a proposition). Unfortunately, I am unable to pursue this here. I am certain that the issue of self-deception is more complex than I initially had thought. I do not find the solutions to the problem presented here particularly satisfying. However, I hope I have shown with some clarity why they are so. Perhaps there are further views that I have not yet considered, and I should like to pursue this issue further at some point in the future.

Bibilography

  1. Arruda, A.I, (1980.n "A Survey of Paraconsistent Logic", n A.I Arruda, R. Chuaqui, and N.C.A da Costa, eds. Mathematical Logic in Latin America (North Holland, 1980). P.1-41
  2. daCosta, N.C.A & French, S (1990). "Belief, Contradiction and the Logic of Self-Deception", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 27, p.179-197.
  3. Demos, R. (1960), "Lying to Oneself". Joural of Philosophy Volume 57, p.588-595
  4. Finagarette, H. (1969) Self-Deception. London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul.
  5. Mele, A. (1983), "Self-Deception". Philosophical Quarterly vol. 33, p.365-377.
  6. Mele, A (1987), "Recent Work on Self Deception", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 24, Jan 1987.
  7. Priset, G., Routely, R & Norman, J. (eds) (1989). Paraconsistgent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent (Munich: Philosophia Verlag; 1989).

  1. For a discussion of the state / process paradoxes of self-deception see Mele (1987)
  2. There are many other partitioning arguments that differ from Demo's, but the length of this paper precludes their mention.
  3. There are a number of examples of Para consistent logics. See Arruda, A. (1980) and Priest (1989) for examples. They all seem to follow what might be called a "naturalist" approach.
  4. And, to be quite honest, I would be deceiving myself if I thought I understood the system that is presented.
  5. This is probably a tendentious claim. If an intentional consistency is removed from the system, it may still conflict with other claims. But if these claims are unknown, they would be unintentional consistencies. If they are unintentional consistencies, we would not be aware of them anyway, so how would our intentional system be affected?


The Winnipeg Arena Debate, 1995


The issue of constructing a new arena complex in Winnipeg has been one which has haunted Winnipeg citizens for the last decade. Consistently, when Winnipeg Jets have failed to become a financially profitable organization. Their owner, Barry Shenkarow, has accredited this failure to the inadequacies of the existing arena facilities. These facilities, he claims, are not only inefficient, but lack the amenities necessary to attract a sufficient audience. Within these confines, Shenkarow believes the construction of a prosperous N.H.L team in Winnipeg impossible. In 1990, therefore, Shenkarow finally left Winnipeg City Council with an ultimatum: either construct an arena within which the Jets may prosper, or he will be forced to sell the team.

With an almost uncanny consistency, a "new", "different: and "better" proposal has appeared on council desk every few years since. Initially, the onus rested solely upon municipal and provincial governments to fund the proposed construction. More recently, however, there arose from the business community a cohesive group - Manitoba Entertainment Complex (MEC) - that offered to shoulder some of the financial burden. Nonetheless, a substantial contribution of public funds is still required from both levels of government before this venture may succeed. In 1995, despite much political opposition, both legislatures appear quite eager to invest this money. They see the Jets as comprising a significant portion of the Winnipeg economy, and thus a great financial loss should they be lost. It is the purpose of this paper, therefore, to analyze whether the allocation of public funding for an arena construction is indeed a profitable investment. It will show that the Jets do not contribute significantly to the Winnipeg economy in the existing arena, nor will they do so I any other. It will elucidate the dangers of investing public money into a large hockey team from a small city, and, for these reasons, it will argue explicitly that any public expenditure for arena construction would be an inexcusable waste of scarce resources.

To begin this discussion, it is worthwhile to first frame the economic argument espoused by both MEC and City Council. In 1990, two separate studies were commissioned by the Jets to demonstrate the economic significance of the hockey team within the city. These reports - herein referred to as the Coopers and Lybrand reports - considered various economic aspects, and concluded that were the Jets to leave, with them would go $47.2 million of economic revenue (Coopers and Lybrand, April, 1990). Upon hearing this, Council, immediately realizing the importance of keeping the team within the city, agreed to issue the public funding required to do so - the assumption being that these funds would be more than reimbursed with the future revenues provided by the team.

As these two reports comprise the foundation of the argument for public funding, it is useful to examine them in detail. Coopers and Lybrand begin by adopting a gross analysis of the economic impact f the team. They simply take the direct expenditures generated by the team, and add to them the secondary expenditures related to providing the games (totalling $18.9 million). These expenditures are then multiplied by an index of 2.5 to obtain the aggregate economic impact of the team (totalling $47.2 million) (Coopers & Lybrand. 1990a - See Table 1). The result, as interpreted by MEC and Council, is he real economic loss suffered by the city should the Jets leave (Black & Dolecki, 1994:4).

Direct Expenditures

This data has, without analysis, largely been accepted as fact. However, economists Black and Dolecki (194) examined the Coopers and Lybrand reports and discovered many major flaws. The basic methodology of a gross economic analysis is to examine the team as it were not itself art of a larger economic sphere; as if, were the team not present, no other spending would occur. However, data for the 1991-92 season indicates that the majority of team revenue - which translates directly into expenditure - comes from ticket sales (Black & Dolecki, 1994). In fact, the amount received from ticket sales is virtually equal to the direct expenditures by the team ($9.7 vs. $10.1 million respectively). This means that most monies expended by the team come directly from fan support. Black and Dolecki find it illogical to assume that, were the jets sold, fans would not sped money on other entertainment. The Jets comprise but one corporation in a much larger entertainment industry. It seems logical to assume that if the Jets left Winnipeg, the need for entertainment would not disappear. Rather, it is more likely "that the fans would divert their spending to other things such as restaurant meals, a night at the theatre, etc:" (Ibid: 5). for this reason, a gross (or aggregate) economic analysis is completely inappropriate. Rather, a net analysis -considering the effects on the economy as a whole - is much preferred. When this is accomplished, the $10.1 million spent in the province by the team in direct expenditures (See Table 1) would instead be spent n other entertainment should the team be sold. There would be no net loss of monies, only a reallocation of them.

Secondary Expenditures

Similarly, Coopers and Lybrand consider fan expenditure on concessions and parking to inject $2.5 million into the Winnipeg economy. They believe that if the Jets were not in the city, these expenditures would be lost. While Black and Dolecki (pg 5) assume these expenditures would be accounted for within a net analysis, they fail to provide an argument justifying this assumption. IT would seem likely, however, that the inability of fans to spend on arena concessions and parking would free up more of their individual income. This increase would most certainly be used to purchase other local goods and services.

Coopers and Lybrand attribute another $5.5 million of economic input to the expenditure of fans coming to Winnipeg solely to watch a Jets game. We may turn again to Black and Dolecki for an analysis of this assertion. Coopers and Lybrand base this argument on surveys conducted by the Jets organization of patrons attending the games. These surveys show a significant out-of-town attendance. However, these surveys ask only where patrons come from, or why they were in the city. It is most likely they are in for other reasons (i.e... conventions, conferences, shopping, etc) and take in a game as an after-thought (ibid: 6). If the jets were not in the city, these expenditures would appear in other entertainment genres.

The final flaw, according to Black and Dolecki, is the multiplier used by Coopers and Lybrand to determine the aggregate affect of these expenditures. The concept of this multiplier rests on a relatively sound economic theory. Each time a new expenditure occurs in an economy, a "ripple effect" is created. As that money is spent, the profit is collected and spent yet again by the receiving firm, and the process repeats itself. Multipliers determine reliably the aggregate affect the initial expenditures have upon the economy.

The multiplier used by Coopers and Lybrand - 2.5 - is much too high. The team is part of the Amusement and Recreation Service industry. In 1990, the national index for this industry across Canada was only 1.68 (Statistics Canada). In 1984, the most current year available for Manitoba, this index was 1.19. Surely such a gross over estimation would constitute a gross exaggeration of any economic significance held by the team.

After an in-depth critical analysis, therefore, it becomes blatantly obvious that the Jets lay nowhere near the roll in the economy attributed to them by Council and MEC. Of the $18.9 million of direct expenditures (and thus, supposedly, economic benefits) accredited to them by the gross analysis of Coopers and Lybrand, $18.1 million has been shown to remain within the Winnipeg economy independent of the Jets presence. Admittedly, those revenues accrued from the expenditures of visiting teams ($0.3 million) as well as broadcast revenues ($0.5 million) comprise a net addition to the economy. These additions would be present only with the presence of the team, and thus would result in a net los should the team leave.

Even allowing the grossly exaggerated multiplier advanced by Coopers and Lybrand, however, the net economic benefit would come to only $2 million ($0.5 + $0.3 million * 2.5) - a far cry from the $47.2 million previously reported. It might not even be illogical to assume that greater economic benefits may arise from the Jets in absentia. After all, the diversification of spending from the team to other local goods and services would likely result in a greater "ripple" throughout the economy. After all, these individuals would seem more likely to spend a larger portion of the net income locally than would the members of the Jets organization (Black and Dolecki: 7). After all, for the most part, they are full-time citizens, while Jets often frequent other cities.

Furthermore, as any plan to maintain the Jets would require a substantial amount f public funding (the exact amount being contested and dealt with later. IT is reasonable to assume that the same amount of public money, injected directly into the economy by way of social expenditures (i.e., Health Care), would create a significant amount f new employment. With employment comes taxable income (and thus revenue). With the prospect of new revenue, it would hardly be difficult to make up whatever difference would be lost with the sale of the Jets.

Even though these quantitative benefits now seem rather suspect, arena supporters cite a variety of qualitative benefits resulting from the presence of an N.H.L franchise in the city. These benefits, though hard to measure, must surely exist, proponents claim. Among these are included the feelings of "community confidence" and "external respect" the team presently lends to the city. The assumption being that the presence of the team portrays the city as economically sound ad thus conducive to investment interests (Both Susan Thompson and Scott Taylor have been avid proponents of this view; as well, it is cited in Coopers and Lybrand). Losing the team would thus portray the picture f a city in economic decline, ad thus discourage prospective investors. It may indeed be true that investors will not invest in "economic decline". However, perhaps the notion of economic decline should be extended to include the fact that Winnipeg is the Child Poverty capital of Canada. Certainly as much, or even more "Community Confidence" would be displayed if measures were taken to erase this embarrassing label.

Even should one reject this philosophical argument (though it s indeed sound), the economic facts remain the same: The Winnipeg Jets do not currently comprise a significant portion of the Winnipeg economy. Certainly, in the present situation, no public money would be justifiably spent towards maintaining the team. After all, citizens would not see any adequate return on their investment. Thus the next pertinent question is whether a new arena would improve the situation enough to enable the team to contribute to the economy. After all, if a "one-time" public investment is all that is required to turn the Jets into a stable and profitable enterprise - one from which all citizens may prosper - it would seem rather foolish not to invest. Indeed, this is the premise upon which Shenkarow (ad thus MEC and Council) are resting. They claim, as indicated above, that only a new arena would allow the team to become profitable in such manner. There is crucial research; however, that calls this assumption into question.

Robert Baade (1994) undertook an analysis of 36 major U.S cities where there exists professional sorts franchises (either baseball,football,hockey,or basketball). From 1958-1987 he collected data to determine whether these franchises formed a significant impact on their respective economies. The economic impact was measured by an increase in real, trend-adjusted, per capita personal income growth. Of all 36 cities, all but one were found to have been either economically unaffected by the presence of the team, or to have been negatively affected. Only one city showed a statistically significant positive influence.

Furthermore, Baade examined the cities where new arenas were built using both private and public funds. He was curious of he economic significant possessed by these new arenas. In all 6 cities, he found that the new arena had not contributed a significant positive impact on the economy. In fact, in 3 of the cities, the new stadium impacted negatively upon the economy of the city.

These results are absolutely astounding. It seems unequivocal that arena constructions are not the magic wand, destined to turn unprofitable franchise into gold-mines. In fact, it could well be that constructing an arena might thrust a city into a worse economic situation (Baade: 18). Even in the large market of Indianapolis where a statistically significant team already exists, a new arena failed to stimulate any future economic growth. Therefore, absolutely no logical reason exists to believe that arena construction in Winnipeg will be any more successful. Indeed, as it is a considerably smaller market than most of the cities analyzed. It might be assumed that a new arena would have a worse impact.

Despite the arguments espoused by Shenkarow, MEC ad Council, there seems to be no logical reason for maintaining the Jets in Winnipeg. Not only do the Jets not comprise any significant economic contribution to the team, but to think they will in a future arena flies in the face of all previous experience. IT seems therefore unquestionable "that the public funding of sports, including funding of stadiums, is not a sound civic economic investment" (Baade: 19).

IT is quite interesting to question the affect these results have had on arena proponents. The answer speaks volumes towards the manner n which this entire debate has been conducted. Quite simply, there has been no public response to the conclusions reached by either Black and Dolecki, or Baade, disregarding countless reminders. As it appears that these cogent arguments will be for the most part ignored, it is fruitful to consider the effects of such neglect.

In comparison to other cities such as Toronto of Los Angeles, Winnipeg is comprised of a very small market with a limited economic base from which to support an N.H.L franchise. The Jets bench currently consists f many of the more talented (and thus sought after) players in the game. These players are relatively young and thus will only develop their skills and improve. Inevitably, with this improvement, come higher salary demands. After al, professional hockey is hardly safe from the pressures of supply and demand.

In the 1994-95 season, the Jets have virtually reached their salary capacity. In the absence of what would have been the life-saving salary cap, it seems inevitable that the Jets bench will clear of the most expensive players (it will be remembered that Tchachuck has been already through arbitration once).

As the bench clears of these valued players, so too with the stands clear of valued attendants. Not only are these layers "crowd pleasers", but they help win games. IF they are lost, incentives to see a losing team are hardly great (as demonstrated with current attendance records). With low attendance, much revenue is lost. With the loss in revenue, it becomes yet more difficult to support a team within a city.

From a pure economic standpoint, it s illogical for Shenkarow to maintain an unprofitable team. As Eric Stefansson has made it clear that no future subsidies will be given to the Jets, the sale of the team is virtually inevitable. (Surely, after all, Shenkarow would not be expected to fund the loss from his own pocket - not when high American dollars are knocking on his door). If an arena deal is reached, citizens will be looking at a white elephant very similar to that of Churchill Forest Industries (Winnipeg Free Press, 1995). The city will have sunk millions of tax dollars into an investment that will not be profitable, but must maintain it to keep from losing more money.

Conclusion

We have now reached the conclusion of our journey. The arena debate has been analyzed thoroughly from its founding arguments. IT seems quite clear that the Jets do not significantly benefit our city, nor will they ever. In fact, if these cogent economic arguments are ignored, it s quite possible council will sink the city into a million dollar hole from which it may never again see light. Once an initial losing investment is made, it is only natural to want to protect it with further investments. It is therefore against this initial investment Winnipeg citizens ad indeed council, must guard.

Though this paper may be seen as anti-jets or anti-sort, this is not the case. IT would need be pleasurable to have an N.H.L team within the city. The problem, however, is that it is uneconomical. In these times of economic scarcity, governments, as they may be conceptualized as the public investment broker, must look for the best value for the dollar. Although it may be questionable as to exactly what the "best-value" is, t is certainly not an investment in an N.H.L team driving up-scale, up-cost, yet down-south.

As the economic facts seem relatively clear, it remains to be seen whether reason will prevail. City council has yet many viable options to opt out of the proposed deal. Whether they choose the path of reason or one yet unmarked, might prove a difficult decision for council. To aid in this decision, it might prove helpful to know that public opinion has consistently been opposed to the public funding f this venture. The latest survey, conducted by CBC/Angus Reid (March 22, 1995), shows that two-thirds o Manitobans are opposed or indifferent to building an arena - whether or not public funds are involved. A full 93% of Manitobans oppose the use of public funds for arena construction. The question now becomes merely a matter of Democracy. The arguments are raised and so are the voices of opposition. All that is left s to hope for government to align reason with democracy.

Table 1
Coopers & Lybrand Estimates of Economic Impact of Jets in Winnipeg Source
Total Expenditures by Jets
$14.7 million
Expenditures in Manitoba
$10.1 million
Salaries
$5.1 million
Other
$5.0 million
Related expenditures
Concessions and Parking
$2.5 million
Line Charges to other cities Re: game broadcasts
$.5 million
Indirect
Expenditures by visiting teams
$.3 million
Expenditures by out of city patrons
$5.5 million
Total expenditures generated by Jets
$18.9 million
Aggregate economic impact 18.9 x 2.5
(Multiplier)
$47.2 million
Black & Dolecki, 1994

Bibilography

  1. Baade, Robert, A (1994) Chicago Metropolitan Planning Council Committee to Determine Costs and Benefits f a New Sorts Stadium in Chicago
  2. Black, E, and Dolecki, J (1994) - Winnipeg Jets Hockey Club and a New Arena Assessment of the Coopers and Lybrand Reports (1990) and the Ogden Entertainment Service Report (1994)
  3. Coopers and Lybrand, April (1990) - Winnipeg Jets Hockey Club: Report f the Projected Economic Benefit of the club operation
  4. Winnipeg Free Press - February 9th, 1995. Frances Russell - Jets on Thin Ice