Self-Deception


"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen, and philosophers and divines" - Emmerson

The concept of self-deception has long been an attractive issue of study for philosophers interested in common language analysis. The attraction rises from the inherent paradox that arises from the state of being self-deceptive and the process of becoming self-deceived . Normally, one models what it means to be self-deceived after what it means to be deceived by someone else. It is often held that for you to deceive me, you must get me to believe wholeheartedly in a proposition that you know, or at least sincerely believe to be false. Following this model, then, self deception occurs when I can get myself to believe a proposition that I truly know is false. The paradox is that in order for self deception to be valid, an individual must hold at the same time, two contradictory propositions (p and not-p) and believe them both to be true. There have been various responses to this paradox from outright rejection of the concept, through to a rejection of the principle of contradiction. In this paper, I wish to consider 3 responses to the paradox of self-deception. 1) Partitioning strategies, 2) Redefinition Strategies, and 3) Para consistent Logic. I will claim that neither of these responses provides a sufficient explanation or solution to the problem. I will argue that, although there certainly seems to be valid cases of self-deception as we conceive it through common language, the analytic attempts have thus far been relatively unsuccessful.

Partitioning Strategies

Many philosophers have made sense of the self-deception paradox by partitioning the mind into separate logical subjects. In doing so, an individual can hold a proposition and the opposite of the proposition without being in a state of contradiction. If, for example, I hold the proposition p and not-p, and I believe them to be true, I am in a state of contradiction because I do not actually believe anything. However, if the mind consists of two or more parts, I can hold the proposition p (along with various reasons for p) within one part, ad the proposition not-p (along with reasons) in the other part. So long at these two parts are distinct, there will never be a contradiction.

One such practitioner is Ralphael Demos. He accepts the standard view that self-deception involves a contradiction:

"Self deception exists, I will say, when a person lies to himself, that is to say, persuades himself to believe what he knows is not so. In short, self-deception entails that B believes both P and not-P at the same time (1960, p.588).

But he divides the mind into distinct parts, separated by "levels of awareness":

"There are two levels of awareness possible; one is a simple awareness, the other awareness together with attending, nor noticing. It follows that I may be aware of something without, at the same time noticing it or focusing my attention on it" (p.593)

Therefore, for Demos, the deceiver is capable of simultaneously believing p and not-p "because he is distracted from the former" (p.594).

The problem with this view is stated succinctly by Herbert Fingarette (1969), who argues that Demo's own position is paradoxical. He points out that deception must be an intentional act. Therefore, if I am to deceive you, I must intend to pull the wool over your eyes. If I am merely wrong about a proposition I convince you to believe, but I sincerely believe that it is true, I have not deceived you - I have only demonstrated by ignorance. Similarly, if I am to deceive myself, I must do so intentionally. Therefore, the 2 propositions p (true) and not-p (false) and I notice not-p, but do not notice p (because not-p is distracting me) I am not self-deceived, merely ignorant of p. Furthermore, Finagarette argues, and individual cannot intentionally fail to notice p, because she has already noticed it: "it appears that it is just because he already appreciates the incompatibility of his beliefs that the self-deceiver 'deliberately ignores' the belief he abhors" (p.16). In this case, the individual would be arty to two contradictory beliefs, and the portioning strategy advanced by Demos has not helped us with the paradox.

Redefinition Strategies

Most common approaches to self-deception insist that the deception seen in self-deceptive situations is the same as the deception seen in interpersonal models. However, there are scholars who believe that the interpersonal models of deception are insufficient to describe self deception. As Mele (1987) states:

"One approach to resolving the paradox of self-deception is to abandon some pertinent features of interpersonal models of he phenomenon. Perhaps it is typically true that when A deceives B, A knows or believes the truth and intentionally gets B to believe a falsehood. But must the self-deceiver know or believe the truth and believe the negation of the true propositions?" (1987, p.8)

Mele answers in the negative, arguing that self-deception occurs because individuals prefer certain beliefs over others. These preferences direct individuals to manipulate the truth value of the respective claims. Thus,

". . . because, e.g., he (the subject takes a certain datum d to count against p, which proposition he wants to be the case, he may intentionally or unintentionally shift his attention away from d whenever he has thoughts of d; but to do this he need not believe that p is false"(1983, p.372).

Therefore, on this view, there is no requirement that the person believes not-p (regarded as true). I a mother wants her son to be good, but the relevant data would lead her to believe otherwise, she might manipulate the implications of the data, or the content of the data itself to represent that belief, but she does not also have to have a belief that her on is not-good the paradox of having two contradictory beliefs is thus avoided.

This is a nice distinction, but we are now left to wonder on the relationship between an individual perceiving a data set and the sae individual drawing conclusions based upon that data set. For Mele's distinction to hold, it seems that an individual would be able to perceive a data set, compare it with the desired proposition, and recognize that the two are inconsistent, ad then modify the dataset to match the desired belief, all without ever holding the contrary position. If a mother can recognize the data set about her son (i.e., that he steals from people and is continually violent), and she can recognize that these facts are inconsistent with her to have a good son, given Mele's logic, two cases are possible. If she manipulates this data "intentionally", she is aware of the not-good proposition and is in fact holding two contradictory beliefs. If, on the other hand, the data manipulation is done unintentionally ("presumably without awareness), it is being accomplished at a lower level of "awareness". If we claim that there are levels of awareness, we have another variant of a portioned mind theory, ad the problems we have already discussed crop up again. It seems that Mele's distinction is thus not valid.

Para consistent Logic Strategies

Up until now we have looked at theories that have had a goal of saving the concept or, self-deception from contradiction. This is because it is taken for granted by most that the formal logic principle of contradiction is as basic as you can get in philosophy; that is, all arguments should be free from contradiction. However, in recent logic theory, the foundational truth of the contradiction principle is being questioned by proponents of Para consistent logic . As it should be expected, this approach has been applied to the problem of self-deception. One of the primary examples of this approach can be found in da Costa and French (1990), who's explicit intention, is to:

"Liberate discussion of self-deception from the shackles of a purely classical logic, thereby permitting a separation of the more philosophical issues from those which might properly be described as "logical" (p.179).

Put simply, their approach will put forward "a Para consistent system which seems capable of accommodating contradictory beliefs" so that the paradox of self-deception no longer exists.

This is an interesting approach that is coupled with a full alternate logic system in the appendix of the paper. The details of logic systems are, for the purpose of this paper, less important than the rationale for adopting this approach. Da Costa and French begin by accepting the distinction between an unintentional inconsistency and an intentional inconsistency. They claim, quite reasonably, that a person may easily enter upon an unintentional inconsistency:

"We are not logically omniscient in the sense of being able to immediately deduce all the consequences of a given proposition that can be deduced by anyone that demands such omniscience is clearly asking too much"(p.185).

Unintentional inconsistencies are not of major interest, however. In fact, there presence in any belief system is a trivial claim; since they are unintentional they are not present in mind at all. What is interesting, for da Costa and French, is what happens when an individual becomes aware of an inconsistency in her belief system. In this case, the inconsistency becomes intentional, and:

"It might be argued that the only rational thing to do is to suitably rearrange one's set of beliefs with a view to eliminate the contradiction of the system"(p.186)

This is where the problem lies, for da Costa and French. They claim that because our standard belief systems are full of an incalculable number of inconsistent deductive chains, it may be impossible to eliminate an intentional inconsistency completely anyway. This is their reasoning for suggesting that the principle of contradiction be "weaken[ed] or abandoned altogether" (p.177)

They then turn to attack the principle of consistency on what they call pragmatic grounds. They ask us to consider an individual that has p and not-p in his mind. Both propositions, they claim reflect the process of reasoning over some sort of empirical data. There is usually lots of empirical data, and this data is usually able to be mobilized for different arguments. As such, an individual holding the propositions p and not-p might well have god reasons for both positions because the data supports them equally well. Thus,

"The removal of inconsistency in this manner may therefore be a practically impossible, or near impossible, undertaking. One might have good reason to hold both of a pair of contradictory beliefs. Thus, for example, the same empirical evidence might equally support the same two conflicting theories, or different, but equally acceptable, pieces of evidence might support two contradictory propositions within a given theory . . . "(p.186).

In this view, a mother who sees her son might view the facts (i.e., "that he is kind towards a senior") and hold the position that her son is good. On the other hand, she might view another set of facts (i.e., that he steals and is violent) and hold the proposition that her son is not-good. Da Costa and French believe that this consists in holding two contradictory propositions; and, more importantly, they hold that this inconsistency is inherent for human beings trying to understand the complex world. As this is par for human existence, we should not be rigid on the logic of contradiction and perhaps a logic that abandons this principle is in line with how we process information anyway (p.190). With this new logic that accepts contradictions, self-deception would be a valid concept, despite the fact that it depends on contradiction.

This argument sounds acceptable at first glance. However, if considered, I think there is something wrong with it. The main thrust of the argument is that human beings naturally hold inconsistent thoughts and there is no ridding ourselves of inconsistency. As such, we are setting our goals too high to ask for consistent thoughts by utilizing the principle of contradiction. This argument depends; it seems, on two things. First, it depends on a set of facts that are so infinitely complex that we can never determine them all (or know when we have); and second, it depends on individuals "collecting" distinct propositions based upon differing data.

Although the first dependency may not be self-obvious, it is sound enough to leave it be here. However, it is not at al clear that individuals may draw distinct propositions based on differing data. That every month will draw two inconsistent propositions from the fact that "my son steals" and "my son is kind to seniors" require much more argument than is present. Rather than drawing the inconsistent -distinct- propositions "my son is god" and "my son is not good", it seems equally likely that the conclusion might be the consistent claim that "my son is imperfect". Or, assuming that an individual might value private property more than a principle of kindness, these two facts might still manifest themselves into the propositions "my son is not-god". I suggest here that da Costa and French are relying upon a theory of data collection and synthesis that they have certainly not argued for. It is not clear that humans are naturally inconsistent at al, except in the sense that they've defined it.

Conclusions: Is Self-Deception a Viable Concept?

When I first began this paper, I believed self-deception to be a viable notion, resting not on a contradiction between two contradictory propositions, but on a distinction between the real state of affairs and an individual's Ideal state of affairs. I am now uncertain that this claim can be made. After all, would this not still be a contradiction in beliefs? For instance, a contradiction in the belief f what is real and what one wish to be real? Perhaps there is some room to move with this claim because a wish might not hold the same epistemic status that a belief would (i.e., the status of a proposition). Unfortunately, I am unable to pursue this here. I am certain that the issue of self-deception is more complex than I initially had thought. I do not find the solutions to the problem presented here particularly satisfying. However, I hope I have shown with some clarity why they are so. Perhaps there are further views that I have not yet considered, and I should like to pursue this issue further at some point in the future.

Bibilography

  1. Arruda, A.I, (1980.n "A Survey of Paraconsistent Logic", n A.I Arruda, R. Chuaqui, and N.C.A da Costa, eds. Mathematical Logic in Latin America (North Holland, 1980). P.1-41
  2. daCosta, N.C.A & French, S (1990). "Belief, Contradiction and the Logic of Self-Deception", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 27, p.179-197.
  3. Demos, R. (1960), "Lying to Oneself". Joural of Philosophy Volume 57, p.588-595
  4. Finagarette, H. (1969) Self-Deception. London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul.
  5. Mele, A. (1983), "Self-Deception". Philosophical Quarterly vol. 33, p.365-377.
  6. Mele, A (1987), "Recent Work on Self Deception", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 24, Jan 1987.
  7. Priset, G., Routely, R & Norman, J. (eds) (1989). Paraconsistgent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent (Munich: Philosophia Verlag; 1989).

  1. For a discussion of the state / process paradoxes of self-deception see Mele (1987)
  2. There are many other partitioning arguments that differ from Demo's, but the length of this paper precludes their mention.
  3. There are a number of examples of Para consistent logics. See Arruda, A. (1980) and Priest (1989) for examples. They all seem to follow what might be called a "naturalist" approach.
  4. And, to be quite honest, I would be deceiving myself if I thought I understood the system that is presented.
  5. This is probably a tendentious claim. If an intentional consistency is removed from the system, it may still conflict with other claims. But if these claims are unknown, they would be unintentional consistencies. If they are unintentional consistencies, we would not be aware of them anyway, so how would our intentional system be affected?


Can Man Measure Himself?
Examining the bounds of Reason in Contemporary Relativism


Philosophical theories expressing truth and morality in relative terms are at least as old as philosophy itself. Perhaps one of the first versions of relativism was stated by Protagoras, who claimed that "man was the measure of all things". When developed, this claim spells out a relativist theory holding that each of us has an individual perception of the world, and that these perceptions are distinct from our fellows. As such, my perceptions may differ from yours, but because we can never get beyond our perceptions and access "Reality" directly, our individual perceptions are the only basis for truth; if I find my food sour, it is so (for me); if you find the same food plain, it is so (for you).

For as long as relativism has existed, there have been critics who have found it untenable, ad the most famous Protagorean critic was surely Socrates. When confronted with a Protagorean truth claim in Theaetetus, Socrates proceeds to advance criticism which he believes demonstrates both the incoherence and self-refutation of relativism. Modern defences of relativism have pointed out that the Socratic criticism errs in a fundamental way: it presupposes an objective reality and thus entirely begs the question.

Modern critics of relativism generally recognize and an appreciate Socrates' mistake, but for various reasons cannot accept the prospect of relative truth. The current discussion is focused on developing a critique of relativism that does not beg the question; one that pinpoints the inconsistencies and errors inherent in relative conceptions of truth and morality. Although these non-question-begging critiques have been plentiful, here are two that particularly stand out: Davidson's 1973 article, "on the very idea of a Conceptual Scheme", and Siegel's 1987 work, "Relativism Refuted". Both works form a significant contribution to the debate in question; both works put forth a brilliant technical analysis; and both works fail to develop a critique of relativism that des not beg the question, or at least that is what I will argue here.
In this paper I wish to examine the critiques advanced by Davidson and Siegel. I will recreate the Socratic argument against Protagoras and demonstrates its mistaken logic; I will then turn to these arguments and show that, like Socrates, their criticisms beg the question against relativism by relying on an absolutists understanding of the truth.

The Theaetetus

It is here that Socrates charges young Theaetetus to give a holistic account of knowledge. After several unsatisfying attempts, a frustrated Theaetetus provides this response: "it seems to me that a man who knows something perceives that he knows and the way it appears at present, at any rate, "knowledge is simply perception" [151e]. Socrates attributes this claim to Protagoras, and in restating it, it is clear that he believes it represents the most extreme form of relativism:

"To the sick man the things he eats both appear and are bitter, while to the healthy man they both appear the opposite. Now what we have to do is not to make one of these two wiser than the other - that is not even a possibility 0 nor is it our business to make accusations, calling the sick man ignorant for judging as he does, ad the healthy man wise because he judges differently [166e-167a]".

Self-Referential Falsity

On this view, all knowledge and truth are completely relative to the person perceiving it. X is true for me if and only if I perceive X to be true and false for me if and only if I perceive X to be false. There is no external standard for comparing the accuracy of truth claims, and the individual becomes the only measure f right and wrong. Socrates does not accept this view, and throughout the Theaetetus, he attracts it from various angles. Here I will consider his two main charges :

The first is the accusation of self-referential falsity and begins thus:

"Or what are we to say Theodorus? If whatever the individual judges by means of perception is true for him; if no man can asses another's experience better than he, or can claim authority to examine another man's judgement and see if it be right or wrong; if, as we have repeatedly said, only the individual himself can judge of his own world, and what he judges is always true and correct: how could it ever by, my friend that Protagoras was a wise man, so wise as to think himself fit to be the teacher of other men and worth large fees; while we, in comparison with him are ignorant ones, needed to go and sit at his feet - we who Are ourselves each the measure of his own wisdom? Can we avoid the conclusion that Protagoras was just playing to the crowd when he said this? I say noting about my own case of midwifery and how silly we look. So too, I think des the whole business of philosophical discussion. To examine and try to refute each other" appearances and judgements when each person's are correct - this is surely and extremely tiresome piece of nonsense, if the truth of Protagoras is true, and not merely an oracle speaking just from the impenetrable sanctuary of a book: [161d-162a]

Here Socrates notices that if truth is indeed measured by individual perception, then there are no absolute standards of right and wrong. If there are no such standards, ay claim to absolute truth cannot be made. As such, the same must be true relativist theories. If Protagoras believes relativism true, he does so based on his perceptions. If, instead, he tries to tell you that relativism is true when you might (and likely do not) already believe it, he is trying to modify your perceptions in terms of his own. This places relativism in a position of making absolute claims. This is the claim the relativist suggest is impossible, and hence relativism would be self-referentially false: it is true (for all) that al truths are relative to individual perceptions.

Incoherence

Socrates' second attack is more complex and revolves around what he considers to be an implication of the Protagorean claim: "that no-one can think falsely". If all opinions are true for those who believe them, Socrates argues, it follows that no person holding the sincere belief X could be wrong. Suppose I believe that P is true, and you believe not-p is true. This situation is especially troublesome if, for example, is the above statement f truth. If my perception leads me to believe in relative truth, relative truth as a proposition must be false. Given that all individuals are the only measure of truth, I must admit that your perceptions are true. If you perceive relative truth to be false, I must admit that this is a true proposition; following this logic, I must therefore acknowlege that if relativism is true, it is false.

"Protagoras admits, I presume, hat the contrary to his own opinion (namely, that it is false) must be true, seeing that he agrees that all men judge what is ... [and] in conceding the truth of the opinion of those who think him wrong, he is really admitting the falsity of his own opinion" [171a-171b].

And with this, Socrates concludes that relativism is incoherent:

"It will be disputed, then, by everyone, beginning with Protagoras - or rather, it will be admitted by him, when he grants to the person who contradicts him that he judges truly - when he does that, even Protagoras himself will be granting that neither a dog 'nor the man in the street' is the measure of anything at all which he has not learned" [171b-171c].

Socrates believes that he has demonstrated relative truth to be both self-refuting and incoherent, but his reasoning here is generally thought to be in error. To see this, we must have a closer examination of the concept "Truth". Protagoras claims that perceptions are true for the individual perceiving them." If I perceive P, P is true for me; if you perceive not-p, not-p is true for you. In this case, what I know as truth, ad more importantly, what I know - period - is what I perceive. Therefore, Protagoras' claim might be more accurately stated as I can know only what I perceive . As such, my belief in truth of P and your belief in truth of not-P are conflicting: I perceive P and do not perceive not-P; because I have no perception of not-P, I have no knowledge of it, and the same s true for you in relation to the concept P. If I have no knowledge of not-p, I cannot verify the accuracy of the propositions.

This, I believe, is a fair way to expand the claim that man is the measure of all things. Socrates, however, characterizes it differently. For him, if I perceive P, it is true, but this truth is not merely a claim about my perception; it is a claim about a state of affairs in the world. Therefore, the claim P is true is not the claim that I perceive P, but the claim that P is an accurate description of the external world. Since we have the external world in common, if I claim P and you claim not-p, we have two contrasting claims about one world. Given that both claims are about the same objective property in the world, it is incoherent to claim that both P and not-P are true objectively.

The point here, however, is that Protagoras is not referring to truth as truth about a common external world, but rather the truth about the perception itself. For Protagoras, P is true for the individual that perceives P; not-p is true for the individual that perceives not-p. Socrates incorrectly assumes that all truth claims are objective, absolute claims about the world: P is true for all if he individual perceives P. As such, his "[criticism] begs the question against relativism in [his] implicit reliance upon an absolute theory of truth" (Swoyer, 1982, p.95).

Frame-Work Relativism

Protagorean relativism may still have some proponents, but it is being replaced largely by a strain or relativism that emphasizes a common frame work between like-thinking individuals. The assumption is that members of the same culture generally have a similar view of the world, and this view provides a coherent set of standards to individuals within it. As Weinert states:

"The standards available to assess the value of the activity under review are, in some sense, internal to a given framework of reference which cannot, by act of assessment, be transcended. Thus relativism implies the existence of some kind of framework - be it social, epistemological or linguistic - within which activities or entities can (comfortably) be judged rational, moral or beautiful but which, at the same time, constitute boundaries beyond which the assessments cannot extend without clashing with standards derived from different frameworks" (1984, p.377).

Frameworks or conceptual schemes, the, give individuals a criterion for judging the merit of arguments within their own schemes. These schemes are distinct, however, ad thus ideas internal to one scheme cannot be judged between schemes. Inter-scheme judgments would require a scheme-independent perspective, and as we are all bound to a conceptual scheme, they cannot be made.

It is this framework relativism that Davidson attacks. With brilliant analysis, he aims to show that the very notion of a scheme depends on the impossibility of meaning translation between schemes. Davidson's meaning of a conceptual scheme is almost identical to that presented above:

"Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. There may be no translating from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs, desires, hopes, and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true counterparts for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality is itself relative to a scheme: What counts as real in one system may not be in another "[1973, p.5].

Davison begins his discussion with an analysis of the conceptual scheme concept. He equates conceptual schemes with languages and argues that ``where conceptual schemes differ, so do languages`` (p.184). He further argues that in order for scheme relativism to be coherent, propositions under one scheme cannot be translated into equal-meaning propositions under another scheme. Suppose we share a conceptual scheme and within it we hold the proposition P to be true, were under another scheme the proposition X is true. The scheme relativist holds the accuracy of P in relation to X. But if we can translate the meaning of P into the language (scheme) of those that hold X, there is no, according to Davidson, a standard to judge P in relation to X. There is, therefore, no longer any substantial grounds to hold that there are two distinct conceptual schemes. In this way, Davidson links the coherence of a scheme to the failure of translation between schemes:

``the failure of translation is a necessary condition for difference of conceptual schemes: the common relation to experiences of the evidence is what is supposed to help us make sense of the claim that it is languages or schemes that are under consideration when translation fails `` [P.12]

Davidson then proceeds to analyze the possibility of either complete or partial failure of translation between the conceptual scheme itself and the content of hat scheme. This distinction itself relies upon either the analytic/synthetic distinction, or a rejection of the relationship between truth and translation he has just argued for. Davidson claims that neither avenue is open for the scheme relativist, and thus schemes cannot fail of translation.

Davidson's argument is brilliant. In a nutshell, it is that the notion of scheme relatvism relies on the notion of untranslatable meaning between schemes; the failure of translation requires a distinction between scheme and content. As this distinction is untenable, translation between schemes must be possible, and if translation is possible between schemes, the notion of distinct alternative schemes is incoherent. Therefore, if the notion of a "scheme" is incoherent, the notion of "scheme relativism" must also be incoherent: no scheme, no scheme relativism.

The Failure of Translation Thesis

Brilliant though it is, Davidson's critique does not escape criticism. I will argue here that his analysis of scheme relativism presupposes an objective standard of measure that scheme does not accept. For this, we need to examine closely Davidson's criterion of translation failure.

Davidson argues that if proposition P under scheme P can be translated into an equal-meaning proposition under scheme X, there can be "meaningful debate", and scheme relativism is incoherent. However, I am uncertain whether the ability to understand the meaning attached to the proposition P is a sufficient condition for negating the scheme entirely.

Consider on standard claim used by scheme relativists to demonstrating their point, the case of Galileo and Cremonini . The story has it that Cremonini refused to look through Galileo's telescope to see the Jovian moons. It was not that he did not understand Galileo's claim and the threat they posed to his "Aristotelian" conceptual scheme of astronomy; he clearly did so. Rather, it was that he did not believe Galileo's claim, and rejected the use of a telescope as a standard for evaluation or proving it.

One can both imagine and recall many similar cases. Consider the Greek philosopher that rejects the western scientist's empirical evidence as proof for a theorem. Clearly the philosophy understands what the scientist is claiming and the assumptions with relation to cause/effect data, but she rejects the possibility of relying on such empirical data as the basis for truth claims. The important point here is that the issue is not a failure of translation between the two conceptual schemes. Both propositions are clearly translated claims of equal-meaning in the respective languages, yet there still remains an irresolvable dispute between alternative conceptual schemes. At issue, is not the meaning of the propositions, but the standards used to evaluate these propositions: Cremonini does not believe in the standards of "the telescope", and the philosopher does not believe me the standard of empiricism? IF neither party accepts the other's standards, there can still be no way of evaluating - objectively, independent of scheme - which claim is "true". These cases suggest that Davidson's failure of translation thesis is insufficient for defining a conceptual scheme . I think there is an explanation for this deficiency.

In claiming that distinct schemes can exist only if proposition P from one scheme cannot e translated into an equal-meaning proposition in another scheme, he is making meaning the defining characteristics of schemes. In doing so, he works with the implicit assumption that two individuals, both perceiving P and understanding P will reach (or be able to reach) the same conclusions in regards to P's claim about the world. The accuracy of this assumption "depends on a foundation - some foundation -"(p.197) by which humans understand and synthesize meaning into truth claims. For Davidson, therefore, we must work on the charitable assumption, that all humans share one fundamental ability that will negate all attempts at distinguishing distinctive schemes. This ability is reason. Given the proposition of P and the meaning of P, two humans, regardless of context, will, by exercising reason, be able to have a "meaningful disagreement" -- that is, a disagreement resulting in objective, scheme independent truth.

The problem with this argument is that it relies on reason as the fundamental absolute standard that will transcend schemes. In doing so, it completely divorces it from the debate concerning relative truth. In my estimation, however, reason can and should be considered part of the way a human "views the world" . If the issue in question is whether a conceptual scheme provides a distinct way of viewing the world, it seems to me quite likely that the way individual's reason might also differ in relation to a conceptual scheme. So Galileo and Cremonini can understand each other and indeed use different standards of reasoning to reach their conclusions about the world. Davidson assumes that reason is a fundamental, scheme independent standard when it is exactly the possibility of a fundamental, scheme independent standard of reason that is in question. In this way, l I suggest that Davidson's analysis begs the question of relativism.

Siegel and Quine

Sigel's 1987 work, ``Relativism Refuted`` is the product of a frustration in philosophy`s inability to pin relativism to the matt, once and for all. He claims that all previous attacks on relativism fail, for various reasons, and ```we are back, then, in the situation in which we left Popper: acknowledging the coherence of framework relativism, but I need f an argument against it. In the next section I shall offer such an argument`` (p.42).

The argument that Siegel offers relies on a claim made by Quine: `Truth, says the cultural relativist is culture-bound. But if it were, then he, within his own culture, ought to see his own culture-bound truth as absolute. He cannot proclaim cultural relativism without rising above it, and he cannot rise above it without giving it up (1975, p.313-28).

The claim here is that, if framework relativism is correct, ``the framework relativist . . . would be unable to recognize the equal status of alternative frameworks, for she would be unable to transcend her own. She would thus regard her own framework as absolute`` (Siegel, p.43). Given that you and I exist under two different conceptual schemes, if P is true under mine and not-P is true under yours, in order for me to recognize not-p, I must transcend my conceptual scheme in order to see not-p . Since framework relativism is the claim that we cannot transcend our conceptual schemes, framework relativism must be incoherent. To accept framework relativism is to be able to transcend your scheme, to be able to transcend your scheme is to give up framework relativism.

I think there are two points of note in this argument. First, to say that we must transcend our scheme in order to perceive the claims made by another relies on a radical extension of Davidson`s failure f translation thesis; not only do I have to transcend my scheme to understand not-p, I must transcend my scheme to be able to even perceive not-p.

This claim seems harder to argue against than Davidson`s because it does not appear to rely n a criterion of meaning; if you can even perceive a different scheme, you have to give up scheme relativism. But further analysis is necessary here, for I do not think Quine (and thus Siegel) have successfully divorced their critique from a principle that is not already in question. Consider two claims from two distinct schemes. Suppose that I hold the proposition p. However, one day we meet ad you express the claim not-p to me. Assuming that we can understand each other`s claim, we now have two contrasting propositions in our minds. Supposing further that we wish to analyze the contradiction, we would presumably give our reasons for holding our respective claims. If it is possible for one of u to convince the other that our reasons are superior, it might be said that we do not exist in two conceptual schemes, or that the schemes were not so distinct that they could not be merged. However, if after much analysis, we do not reach agreement, it is likely the case that our standard of judging truth differ. Though we understand each other perfectly, we cannot reach agreement with regards to the contradiction because we do not work from the same standards (recall Galileo and Cremonini). It is only at this point that we may recognize and understand that we are operating under different conceptual schemes, where claims are cannot be evaluated because our reference to different standards.

Quine (and Siegel for relying on Quine) seems to misunderstand the process of scheme conception. He assumes that in order to conceptualize a claim as coming from a different scheme, we must first conceive the entire scheme. In doing so, I contend he is putting the cart before the horse: we do not perceive schemes, we perceive propositions, ad the standards for judging the truth of propositions result in different conceptual schemes, not vice versa .

The second point to be made with regard to Quine`s reduction attack. He claims that ``the relativist must see his own culture-bound truth as absolute`` (from above). This argument is not dissimilar from the Socratic- some ideas must necessarily be false- argument discussed earlier. The framework relativist claims that all propositions are scheme dependent, and as such cannot be evaluated outside f their own scheme. IF one is to take relative truth as a standard that defines a scheme (and I see no reason not to and many frame relativists do indeed hold this position), then it cannot be evaluated outside of the scheme of relative truth. If Quine insists that framework relativists must see truth as absolute in their own scheme, he is trying to force relativists to accept his standard of absolute truth when they do not, and this is exactly what is at issue. As Siegel insists:

``First the framework relativist must, in order to join the issue with the non-relativist, defend framework relativism non-relativistically. To ``defend`` framework relativism is true (correct, warranted, etc) `` is to fail to defend it, since the non-relativist is appropriately unimpressed with such framework-bound claims. But to defend framework relativism non-relativistically is to give up, since to defend it this way is acknowledge the legitimacy of frame-work neutral criteria of assessment of claims, which is precisely what the framework relativist must deny`` (p.44).

To this claim, the framework relativist will say: ``Why must I take your standard of absolute truth as the standard of evaluation? This is the very standard that I reject, and it is the possibility of such objective evaluation that I hold suspect". Quine and Siegel, in this respect have begged the question. The claiming that relativists must accept absolute truth to argue at all is to suggest that they must accept exactly what it is that is in question - the standards they reject - in order to evaluate the claim.

Conclusion Man, can he measure anything?

I have here argued (I hope convincingly) that both Davidson and Siegel/Quine have begged the question in their attack on relativism. One may feel understandably frustrated if wanting a criticism of the conclusions brought about by relative truth. The implications is that such a critique cannot actually begin without defeating itself entirely; indeed, if two people hold completely different standards and they are evaluating the same claim, it does seem impossible to reach an agreement without one party adopting he standards of the other. In this situation I see two possibilities: The case of honest intent, and the case of opportunism.

With the first case I do not necessarily see the conclusions drawn from scheme relativism are problematic. Both parties have an honest disagreement and sincerely wish to discuss it and analyze the issues in question. Even though we can dosage n our standards (and thus all our propositions) we can still analyze each other's standards for internal consistency. If my standards are internally consistent, this might give me a reason to re-evaluate them. If I revaluate my standards and reach different conclusions it means that I am being elective and thoughtful in my relationships with others. I hold that this is the cause for celebration; it means that we have an achievable, far less pretentious goal than dogmatic truth-seeking will ever allow us.

In the second case, we have either one or both parties operating under intentions that are not honest; either for profit, prestige or any other intent that may be considered instrumental. In this situation, we are open to the concept of analysis turning into a Hegelian contest where the successful/strongest is able to impose their standards on a weaker minority. This might well be an ill-preferred result. Truth will become whoever owns the largest gun, or who is the best marketing wizard. Yet me might do well to remember that many of the worst atrocities have been committed by those who have been absolutely certain of their moral and epistemic right(eous)nes. If people are inclined to use force to prove their standards correct, they will do so regardless of the epistemological status of truth. For those that are interested in discussion, the concept of relative truth should not pose any difficulties: Relativism is hat most conscientious individuals have been practicing anyway. What have we to fear of common sense.

  1. Burnyeat, M. (1990), The Theaetetus of Plato, translation by M.J Levett: Hackett Publishing Company
  2. Davidson, Donald (1973), "On the very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Assosiation, 1973-74. P 5-20.
  3. Quine, Willard Van Orman (1975), "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World". Erkenntis, 9, p. 313-328, Cited in Siegel (1987).
  4. Siegel, Harvey (1987), Relativism Refuted. D. Reidel Publishing Company
  5. Swoyer, Chris (1982),, 'True For', in Meiland & Krausz (1982), Relativism, Cognitive and Moral. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
  6. Weinert, Friedel (1984), 'Contra Res Sempiternas', The Monist 67 p.376-394.

  1. Siegel discusses these charges at length, labelling them 1) "Undermines the Very Notion of Rightness" and 2) "Necessarily Some Beliefs are False".
  2. He might then be pushed into a position of weak epistemological solipsism.
  3. argument is much more detailed than this brief restatement. I have not recreated the complexity because for my purposes it is only necessary to understand that the failure of translation thesis is paramount to his argument.
  4. Despite his claim to the contrary on p.196, where he states that "the main issue is not begged".
  5. Cited in Weinert, p.384-6. Davidson himself uses the example of two friends that disagree over the definition of a ketch and a yawl (p.196). This example could be used, but presumably you would share a conceptual scheme with your friend, and it would be a better example of a Protagorean truth claim and a scheme relative truth claim. For this reason, I will defer to Weinert's example.
  6. Perhaps Davidson collapses "standards" and the notion "meaning", but I do not wish to pursue this here.
  7. Davidson does not offer any argument for another conception of reason.
  8. And here I think the notion ``perceive``, rather than recognize is meant.
  9. Presumably, we can analyze the difference in standards, but there will be a point where this analysis must spiral into an agreement to disagree: this would be the point of scheme distinction.
  10. In this way schemes do not seem to be dependant on language or perception, but on distinct standards. The notion of standards, therefore, requires more analysis. Unfortunately, it cannot be attempted here.
  11. Here I am referring to schemes defied by standards of truth, not language or meaning.